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Abstract 
GENERIC DRUG POLICY IN THE U.S. – 
IMPACT ON DRUG PRICES AND SHORTAGES 
 
Ravi Gupta 
 
Generic medicines offer a significantly cheaper alternative to brand-name 
drugs and have become an indispensable means of maintaining patient access and 
adherence to treatments. In recent years, as a result of monopolistic and 
oligopolistic conditions, generic drugs have begun to increase in price, sometimes 
exorbitantly. The competitiveness of drug markets with respect to the number of 
generic manufacturers and the implications for drug prices and shortages have not 
been systematically studied. 
Two main analyses are presented in this study. First, using publicly available 
information, the timing of generic drug approvals and the total number of generic 
manufacturers for all small-molecule drugs approved between 1984 and 2015 were 
characterized. Second, this study investigated the impact on drug prices and 
shortages of a specific FDA regulation, called the Unapproved Drugs Initiative. 
The first analysis demonstrates that among 417 FDA-approved drugs, 210 
were eligible for generic competition, and 77 (37%) had three or fewer generic 
drugs approved: 16 had three generic approvals, 9 had two, 16 had one, and 36 had 
 
 
zero. Among the 174 drugs with at least one generic approval, the median number 
of generic approvals was 7 (IQR, 4-12). Generic approvals were fewer among 
orphan-designated drugs when compared with non-orphan-designated drugs (18 of 
33 [55%] vs. 156 of 177 [88%]; p<0.001). 
The second analysis found that since 2006, 34 unapproved prescription 
drugs had been addressed by the Unapproved Drugs Initiative (UDI). Nearly 90% of 
those that went on to receive FDA approval were supported by literature reviews or 
bioequivalence studies, not new clinical trials. In addition, once targeted by the UDI, 
drugs experienced price and shortage increases of nearly 40% and 74%, 
respectively. 
Overall, more than one-third of drugs approved after 1984 and without 
protection from patents have three or fewer generic competitors, making them 
vulnerable to price increases. By unintentionally reducing the number of 
manufacturers for specific drugs, the FDA’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative led to 
higher prices and more frequent and longer shortages, highlighting the importance 
of robust generic competition. 
In conclusion, insufficient pharmaceutical competition has created an 
environment enabling price increases of old, off-patent generic drugs, such as 
Daraprim and Epipen. This study highlights that a substantial number of additional, 
similar drugs is vulnerable to such price increases for a variety of reasons. Future 
efforts to reform generic drug policy should seek to boost generic competition, more 
carefully regulate drug prices, and address brand-name pharmaceutical companies’ 
strategies to obstruct the ability of generic manufacturers to compete. In addition, 
 
 
physicians and patients should be bettered educated on the fact that a lack of 
generic competitors may mean that simply prescribing generic drugs will not make 
medications affordable for patients; alternative options may have to be explored. 
Such efforts are essential in ensuring continued patient access to affordable drugs. 
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A Note on Publication 
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student at the Yale School of Medicine. Some of the analyses have been published in 
the biomedical literature over the past year,1,2 while others are currently under 
review. 
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Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act. JAMA Internal Medicine. Jul 18 
2016;176(9):1391-1393. 
 
Gupta, R., Shah, N.D., Ross, J.S. The Rising Price of Naloxone – Risks to Efforts to Stem 
Overdose Deaths. New England Journal of Medicine. Dec 8 2016;375(23):2213-2215. 
 
Gupta, R., Dhruva, S.S., Fox, E., Ross, J.S. The FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative – An 
Observational Study of the Consequences for Drug Prices and Shortages in the 
United States. (under review) 
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Introduction 
 Increasing prescription drug prices in the United States are a cause of 
growing concern for patients, providers, payers, and policymakers. Total spending 
on prescription drugs grew approximately 20% between 2013 and 2015, 
constituting nearly 17% of total U.S. health care cost in 2015 and outpacing overall 
U.S. healthcare spending growth.3,4 Increasing expenditures and prescriptions both 
explain this rapid growth in total spending, though the fact that expenditures have 
risen more quickly than the number of prescriptions indicates that changes in price 
have contributed more to the spending growth. In 2014 and 2015, a surge in 
approvals of patent-protected brand-name drugs and price increases for already 
existing drugs protected from competition by patents and exclusivity both led to 
increased drug expenditures. 
A separate contributor to the overall rise in prescription drug costs has been 
the marked increase in prices of old medicines that are no longer protected by 
patents.5 Despite the fact that these drugs have expired patents and are thus eligible 
for competition from generic competitors, many exist in monopolistic or 
oligopolistic markets. This latter phenomenon is increasingly problematic as it can 
lead to decades-old drugs that are prohibitively expensive. The role of generic 
competitors in enabling this trend has not been systematically studied and requires 
careful attention. 
 
Generic Medicines as a Solution: Driving Competition 
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Generic medicines are interchangeable with their brand-name counterparts 
and play an essential role in health care in the U.S., providing high-value care at 
substantial cost-savings relative to brand-name pharmacological treatments,6 
thereby enhancing patient access to therapy by increasing patient adherence,7 
improving health care outcomes,8 and curbing overall health spending.9,10 Small-
molecule generic drugs have consistently been demonstrated to offer an effective 
and safe option in clinical care.8 
Prior to the early 1980s, however, relatively few drugs were available in 
generic form in the U.S.11,12 and constituted fewer than 20% of all prescriptions.13 
Resistance from brand-name drug manufacturers, who sought to protect their 
market share, and the lack of a clear pathway for generic drug approval at the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), slowed the spread of generics.12,14 This 
changed, however, with the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
(Hatch-Waxman) Act of 1984, which crystallized a pathway for the approval of 
generic medicines, helping to facilitate generic drug availability, while also 
enhancing incentives for the research and development of brand-name drugs. 
Whereas new drugs containing active ingredients that have not previously been 
approved submit New Drug Applications (NDA), this law formalized an abbreviated 
New Drug Application (ANDA) process in which generic drug manufacturers can 
gain FDA approval for off-patent products. Instead of repeating lengthy, expensive 
controlled clinical trials to demonstrate safety and efficacy for an already approved 
drug, generic drugs must meet the standards of bioequivalence. These standards 
require that the generic have the same active ingredient(s) in the same formulation 
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and strength and be as available to or absorbed as equally in the human body as the 
original brand-name drug. Generic manufacturers must still satisfy additional 
regulatory requirements, including labeling, pharmacology and/or toxicology, 
chemistry, manufacturing, and inspection.14 
The Hatch-Waxman Act created additional mechanisms to protect brand-
name drugs from generic competition. First, it extended the term of a drug’s patent 
to compensate the patent holder for the marketing time lost while awaiting FDA 
review and approval, which can take 6 to 8 years.15 A maximum of 5 years of 
extension is allowed, up to a total of 14 years of patent life from the date of drug 
approval.16 
Second, the Hatch-Waxman Act introduced a separate, five- or seven-year 
New Chemical Exclusivity period for new drugs containing at least one active 
ingredient that has previously never been approved.16 During this market 
exclusivity period, competing applications from generic manufacturers may not be 
submitted. However, after 4 years of exclusivity have passed, competitors can file 
ANDA applications but must also simultaneously 1) demonstrate the original patent 
is invalid or is not infringed by the generic product (i.e. “paragraph IV certification”), 
and 2) notify the patent-holder of the submission of the ANDA. The patent-holder 
can file a lawsuit against the generic applicant claiming infringement on the patent, 
in which case the FDA postpones by 30 months the generic manufacturer’s 
application approval, unless the lawsuit is settled before the 30-month period. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act also created an incentive for generic applicants in 
which the first ANDA filer to successfully challenge a brand-name manufacturer’s 
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existing patent enjoys a 180-day exclusivity period.16 Additional generic 
manufacturers can enter the market only after the conclusion of this exclusivity 
period. Overall, the median time between brand-name drug approval and first 
generic availability has remained relatively stable at approximately 12-13 years.17-19 
Patents and market exclusivity create monopolies for manufacturers of 
brand-name drugs, allowing them to set high prices. Once they expire, competition 
from generic manufacturers can quickly and significantly reduce these prices 
(Figure 1).6,20 The Hatch-Waxman Act, in concert with the passage of automatic 
substitution state laws throughout the U.S. allowing pharmacists to substitute 
generic versions for brand-name drug prescriptions, has led to a remarkable 
increase in the availability of generic medications. Generic drugs now constitute 
89% of all prescriptions filled in pharmacies in the U.S. while comprising only 27% 
of total drug costs.21 Between 2005 and 2014 alone, generic drugs were responsible 
for an estimated $1.7 trillion in savings to the U.S. health system.22 
 
Figure 1. FDA Analysis of Effect of Generic Competition on Drug Prices 
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Generic Medicines as a Problem: Monopolistic/Oligopolistic Conditions 
Despite the rapid cost-savings enabled by generics, there have been several 
specific examples of sudden and dramatic price increases of drugs that are no longer 
protected by patents and have been available as generics for years. Pyrimethamine, 
for instance, a drug approved in 1953 to treat toxoplasmosis and available as a 
generic for decades, was acquired in 2015 by Turing Pharmaceuticals, which 
immediately raised its price from $13.50 to $750.23 Similar price increases for old, 
off-patent drugs such as Isuprel (generic: isoproterenol) and Epipen (generic: 
epinephrine) have led to multiple Congressional investigations into companies’ 
pricing strategies.24-26 
These individual examples are part of a larger trend of increasing prices for 
existing generics. Between 2006 and 2012, though the average generic price for 
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widely used drugs decreased by 7% to 14%, one-third of these generics actually 
increased in price in 2013.27 A more recent U.S. Government Accountability Office 
report showed that between 2010 and 2015, more than 20% of generic drugs 
covered under Medicare Part D had price increases of 100% or more, thereby 
blunting the overall decline in generic drug prices.28 The report also found that the 
new prices persisted for at least one year and most did not eventually return to their 
baseline. 
The number of generic drugs approved by the FDA can help explain these 
generic price increases, with prior research showing largely similar but not 
completely consistent findings (Table 1). A 1998 Congressional Budget Office 
analysis concluded that the availability of five generics resulted in an average price 
reduction of 40 percent from the brand-name drug price.29 Two other analyses 
found a similar price-manufacturer threshold: one demonstrated that four generics 
led to a price reduction of approximately 60 percent,30 while another analysis of 
industry pricing data showed that four to five generics led to a 25 percent reduction, 
and 10 generics led to a 30 percent reduction.31,32 In contrast, an FDA analysis of 
sales data for drug products sold from 1999 to 2004 demonstrated that only two 
generic approvals were needed for a 50 percent reduction from the initial price, and 
four to five for a 60 percent price reduction (Figure 1).6 Overall, four generic 
competitors seem to ensure substantial price reductions from brand-name levels. In 
addition, sufficient numbers of generic competitors preclude monopolistic or 
oligopolistic conditions that companies can take advantage of by sharply increasing 
prices.33,34 
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Table 1. Studies Examining Effect of Generic Competition on Drug Pricing 
Author Title Year Summary 
Congressional 
Budget Office 
How Increased 
Competition from Generic 
Drugs has Affected Prices 
and Returns in the 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
1998  5 generics led to 40% 
price reduction 
 
Berndt E.R., et 
al 
Authorized generic drugs, 
price competition, and 
consumers' welfare 
2007  4-5 generics led to 20% - 
60% price reduction 
Reiffen D., 
Ward M.R. 
Generic Drug Industry 
Dynamics 
2005  4-5 generics led to 25% 
price reduction 
 10 generics led to 30% 
price reduction 
Food & Drug 
Administration 
Generic Competition and 
Drug Prices 
2010  2 generics led to 50% 
price reduction 
 4-5 generics led to 60% 
price reduction 
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A systematic study of the competitiveness of drug markets is lacking, 
however. Thus, in the first analysis of this study, we characterize generic drug 
approvals for all new drugs approved since 1984 as a tablet or capsule, including the 
number of generic manufacturers that have received FDA approval and their timing, 
as well as associations between generic drug approval and specific drug product 
characteristics, such as priority review status, orphan drug designation, and 
therapeutic category. We select four generic drug approvals as a sufficient threshold 
for stimulation of price competition based on prior research. By characterizing the 
number of generic versions for each drug, this analysis will help reveal the extent to 
which off-patent drugs are vulnerable to price increases, including sudden price 
changes of drugs like pyrimethamine, which currently has only one manufacturer. 
Several factors can explain why certain drugs may have few generic 
competitors, despite being off-patent and available for years. Availability of raw 
materials, production difficulties, industry mergers and acquisitions, potential 
profits of specific drug markets, FDA application backlogs, and various barriers 
erected by brand-name manufacturers all determine the number of generic 
manufacturers of specific drugs.27,28,35 
In some cases, off-patent drugs have been combined with new modes of 
delivery, such as the Epipen auto-injector. Though the actual drug is not patented 
(in Epipen’s case epinephrine), the new mode of delivery often can be, allowing 
companies monopolies through which they can raise prices precipitously. This is 
exactly what has happened with Epipen, which has combined an old drug with a 
new delivery system and due to the delivery system’s patent has raised its price. An 
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additional example of this is naloxone, which has received comparatively less 
attention and is discussed later in this study in detail as a case study of the effect of 
limited generic competition. 
Furthermore, well-meaning regulations can sometimes also unintentionally 
lead to fewer manufacturers and monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions for 
companies to take advantage of. In the second analysis of this study, we carefully 
investigate the impact on drug prices and shortages of one such FDA regulation, 
known as the Unapproved Drugs Initiative (UDI). 
 
FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative 
Hundreds of drugs are currently marketed in the U.S. without having first 
received approval from the FDA. Most of these drugs are decades-old and available 
largely as an unintended consequence of early legislation (Table 2).36,37 The 1906 
Federal Food and Drugs Act first brought drug regulation under federal law, 
prohibiting interstate commerce in misbranded drugs. The 1938 Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act required manufacturers of new drugs to provide evidence of safety, 
but not efficacy, to the FDA for approval. In 1962, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments 
broadened the FDA’s authority, establishing requirements to also provide evidence 
of efficacy for FDA approval. Drugs that were “identical, related, or similar (IRS)” to 
approved drugs were also required to obtain approval either through an NDA or an 
abbreviated NDA (ANDA). 
To retrospectively determine the efficacy of drugs approved only on the basis 
of safety evidence between 1938 and 1962, the Kefauver-Harris Amendments 
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established the Drug Efficacy Study Implementation (DESI) review, requiring 
market withdrawal of drugs found to be inefficacious.38,39 While over 3,400 drugs 
were evaluated through this process, drugs without FDA approval still remained on 
the market. Most of these unapproved drugs were originally introduced before 
1938, while others were originally introduced between 1938 and 1962 but the 
manufacturer did not comply with the DESI review decision.36 
 
Table 2. FDA Regulations Pertaining to Unapproved Prescription Drugs 
Regulation Year of 
enactment 
Summary 
Pure Food and Drug 
Act 
1906 First brought drug regulation under 
federal law, prohibiting interstate 
commerce in misbranded drugs 
Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act 
1938 New drugs required to provide evidence 
of safety 
Kefauver-Harris 
Amendments 
1962 New drugs required to provide evidence 
of efficacy 
Drug Efficacy Study 
Implementation 
(DESI) review 
1962 Review efficacy of drugs approved 
between 1938 and 1962 only on basis of 
safety 
Unapproved Drugs 
Initiative 
2006 Require approval or market removal of 
currently marketed unapproved drugs 
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Although manufacturers were expected to obtain approval for unapproved 
drugs or withdraw them from the market, their persistent market availability led 
the FDA to enact the UDI in 2006. The FDA developed a plan to require either the 
approval of unapproved drugs or their removal from the market through issuance of 
warning letters or, in some cases, a “seizure, injunction, or other proceeding”.36 As 
part of the UDI, the FDA identifies unapproved drugs being marketed in the U.S. 
through reports of safety issues, lack of effectiveness, health fraud, and compliance 
inspections.36 The UDI directs the FDA to employ a risk-enforcement approach, 
prioritizing drugs that pose greater risks from lack of safety or effectiveness. The 
FDA also continues to rely on compliance efforts from manufacturers who 
voluntarily obtain FDA approval for their previously unapproved drugs.  
Though the FDA has taken regulatory action on more than 500 versions of 
unapproved drugs through the UDI, representing 34 active ingredients, hundreds 
more still exist as different dosages, formulations, and combinations.36 The FDA 
estimated that approximately two percent of all prescriptions dispensed in the U.S. 
in 2006 may have been for versions of drugs that had not received FDA approval.37 
Sublingual nitroglycerin provides an illustrative example. Used by millions of 
patients for relief of angina, the drug was marketed until 2010 by multiple 
manufacturers without approval; 80% of nearly 4.4 million prescriptions for 
sublingual nitroglycerin in 2009 were for versions of the drug that never received 
FDA approval.40 
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While the UDI benefits public health by ensuring marketed drugs have 
demonstrated safety and efficacy, it may also have unintended consequences. Once 
the FDA acts against an unapproved drug, fewer manufacturers remain in the 
market, potentially enabling drug price increases and greater susceptibility to drug 
shortages. Previous articles have explored the historical background for the 
UDI39,41,42 and characterized the experience of individual unapproved drugs,43-45 
including finding that prices46-49 and shortages50 of specific drugs increased after 
they were targeted by the UDI. While these isolated examples highlight particularly 
problematic consequences, there is a need for the systematic study of the prices and 
shortages of all previously unapproved drugs targeted by the UDI. Thus, our 
objective in this study’s second analysis is to identify previously unapproved 
prescription drugs that faced FDA UDI regulatory action or received FDA approval 
after 2006 through manufacturers’ voluntary compliance with the UDI, comparing 
prices and the presence and duration of shortages for these drugs before and after 
UDI action, and characterizing the clinical evidence used to support their approval. 
Understanding the effects of this FDA policy can help illuminate how specific, 
well-intentioned regulations can also lead to increases in drug prices and shortages, 
particularly within the context of price and shortage increases of old, off-patent 
drugs overall.5,51 Moreover, such an analysis can help identify specific policy 
suggestions to refine the UDI in order to ensure continued patient access to 
important drugs.  
14 
 
Statement of Purpose 
In this study, I aim to systematically and empirically evaluate through two 
analyses the current competitiveness of the U.S. generic pharmaceutical market, 
with respect to the availability of generic medicines and the implications for drug 
prices and shortages. The first analysis provides a comprehensive characterization 
of all medicines approved during the study period, while the second analysis 
evaluates the unintended consequences of a specific FDA initiative pertaining to old 
medicines, known as the Unapproved Drugs Initiative. 
 
A. Generic drug approvals since the 1984 Hatch Waxman Act: 
Characterization of the timing of generic drug approvals and total 
number of generic manufacturers for all tablet or capsule small-molecule 
drugs approved between 1984 and 2015. 
 
B. Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for drug 
prices and shortages: Systematic examination of the clinical evidence 
for approval, and a before-after analysis of prices and shortages of 
previously unapproved prescription drugs after being addressed by the 
UDI. 
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Methods 
A Note on Contribution 
 All data collection and analysis were performed by the author unless 
otherwise specified. 
 
Analysis A: Generic Drug Approvals Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act 
Data Sources 
Data on FDA drug approvals were obtained from Drugs@FDA,52 a publicly 
accessible database maintained by the FDA that provides a comprehensive listing of 
approved drug products, including generic versions, as well as approval dates and 
corresponding regulatory action dates. Each drug’s active ingredient via their 
generic name, method of formulation, dosage, market status (discontinued vs 
currently available), and type of drug approval (e.g. new drug, new formulation, new 
combination, etc.) are listed. 
 
Study Sample 
Data were downloaded from Drugs@FDA in January 2016 for drug products 
approved between October 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015. We excluded all drug 
products approved before and after these dates. We constructed a sample of drugs 
approved under a New Drug Application (NDA), excluding tentative approvals, 
biologic therapies, reformulations, combination therapies of non-novel therapeutic 
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agents, over-the-counter drugs, therapeutics not formulated as a tablet or capsule, 
and duplicate listings (Figure 2). When multiple dosage strengths of a drug were 
identified, we selected the currently marketed dosage; if all dosages had been 
discontinued, we randomly selected one for inclusion. 
In addition, we excluded from our sample drugs with current patent 
protections or market exclusivity. Patent and exclusivity data were identified from 
the Orange Book53 in January 2016. The Orange Book is an annual, publicly 
accessible FDA publication listing approved drug products and their bioequivalent 
generics. Drugs with current patent protections or market exclusivity were excluded 
because they are ineligible for generic competition. 
Finally, we excluded drugs discontinued because of safety or effectiveness 
reasons (determined through online searches of public sources and company 
websites), since they are not eligible for generic competition. In contrast, drugs 
discontinued for non-safety or effectiveness reasons were included since they 
remain eligible for generic competition; these drugs may be currently marketed as 
subsequent reformulations. 
 
Figure 2. Sample Construction of New Drug Products Approved by FDA After 
September 30, 1984 
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New Drug Characteristics 
All drug products were categorized as currently marketed or discontinued 
based on Drugs@FDA data; all dosages of a drug product needed to be discontinued 
for it to be considered discontinued. All drug products were also categorized based 
on whether the FDA assigned priority review status to the original NDA and 
whether it received an orphan drug designation for the initial approval indication. 
Priority review status was determined using the Drugs@FDA database and 
confirmed using Aaron S. Kesselheim’s (A.S.K) prior analysis of FDA drug approvals 
since 1938.54 The FDA designates priority review status to drugs considered to be 
therapeutically important advances, and subsequently requires expedited 
regulatory review by the FDA.55 Orphan designation was determined using the 
FDA’s Orphan Drug Product designation database.56 This designation awards 
extended market exclusivity for drugs that treat rare diseases affecting fewer than 
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200,000 individuals per year in the US.57 We also classified drugs into one of seven 
therapeutic classes based on the FDA-approved indication for use of the tablet or 
capsule formulation using the World Health Organization’s Anatomic Therapeutic 
Classification system;58 when a brand-name drug was approved for multiple 
indications in different therapeutic categories (n=3 approvals), we assigned it to the 
category for which it was first approved. 
 
Identifying Generic Versions 
Using Drugs@FDA, we identified FDA-approved abbreviated New Drug 
Applications (ANDA) for bioequivalent generic drugs, based on matching the active 
ingredient and route of administration. For each identified generic drug, we selected 
the first approved dosage of each manufacturer. We excluded tentative approvals 
and duplicate applications filed for the same generic drug by the same 
manufacturer. 
For each drug product, as our main outcome, we determined whether there 
had been any bioequivalent generic drug approvals and, if so, the total number. We 
also determined which drug products had four or more approved generic drugs. For 
every generic drug identified, the date of drug approval was recorded. For all drug 
products, we examined generic drug approval dates at successive time points after 
first generic drug approval. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
19 
 
For drug products eligible for generic competition, we determined the 
proportion for which any bioequivalent generic drug was approved and the 
proportion with four or more generic drugs approved. Among drugs with at least 
one generic drug approval, we determined the median number of generic drug 
approvals. Next, we determined the median number of generic drugs approved at 
specific time points: first generic drug approval, 180 days after first approval, one 
year, five years, 10 years, and 15 years. 
Finally, we used χ2 tests to explore the likelihood of any generic drug 
approval and the likelihood of having four or more generic drug approvals based on 
current market availability, priority review status, orphan drug designation, 
therapeutic category, and year of approval. Based on these same characteristics, we 
used nonparametric testing to compare the median number of generic drugs. For all 
analyses, we used a p value of 0.01 to account for multiple comparisons of the 
characteristics specified above. Analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel 
2010 (Microsoft Corp.; Redmond, WA), JMP Pro 11 (SAS Institutes; Cary, NC), and 
Stata 12.0 (StatCorp; College Station, TX). 
 
Analysis B: Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for drug 
prices and shortages 
Study Sample 
In the second analysis, we constructed a sample of previously unapproved 
prescription drugs that either 1) faced UDI regulatory action or 2) received at least 
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one FDA approval after 2006 through manufacturers’ voluntary compliance with the 
UDI; we excluded previously unapproved over-the-counter drugs because they are 
subject to a different FDA review process. 
Previously unapproved drugs facing UDI regulatory action were identified 
through review of a publicly accessible database of all FDA warning letters since 
2006.59 In some instances, warning letters are sent to individual manufacturers of a 
drug, while in others, blanket warning letters are issued to all manufacturers of 
drugs containing specific unapproved active ingredients (hereafter referred to only 
as ‘drugs’). For example, in 2007 the FDA issued a warning letter to all 
manufacturers of any unapproved drug products containing hydrocodone bitartrate 
or any other salt or ester of hydrocodone, including both cough-suppressants and 
pain relievers.60 
Previously unapproved drugs that received approval through a 
manufacturer’s voluntary compliance were identified from Drugs@FDA, a publicly 
accessible database that provides a comprehensive listing of approved drug 
products. This database was used to identify all New Drug Applications (NDAs) for 
drugs previously “marketed without an approved NDA”.52 Some drugs were labeled 
as previously “marketed without an approved NDA” and also faced UDI regulatory 
action. In these cases, if the drug received at least one NDA approval with such a 
label before regulatory action, it was categorized as a voluntary approval. If the drug 
received all such NDA approvals after regulatory action, it was categorized as having 
faced UDI regulatory action. 
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Clinical Evidence 
For all drugs that received at least one approval after 2006 either after 
issuance of UDI warning letters or through voluntary compliance, we characterized 
the clinical evidence supporting approval, including whether the application 
submitted evidence from newly conducted clinical trials to demonstrate safety and 
efficacy or relied on previously published literature or bioequivalence studies. This 
information was determined by reviewing each drug’s NDA approval documents 
available at Drugs@FDA. For previously unapproved drugs that received approval 
through voluntary compliance, we reviewed the specific drug manufacturer’s NDA 
approval documents. For drugs facing UDI regulatory action, we reviewed the NDA 
approval documents of the first manufacturer to obtain approval after the date of 
UDI regulatory action; abbreviated NDA documents were not reviewed since they 
are for approval of generic drugs, which are required only to demonstrate 
bioequivalence to their NDA counterparts. 
 
U.S. Drug Prices 
We determined the change in average price for each drug during the two 
years before and after UDI regulatory action or approval through voluntary 
compliance using drugs’ average wholesale prices from Micromedex’s Redbook 
database.61 For each drug, we identified the manufacturer with the lowest average 
unit price in the two years prior to voluntary approval or UDI action and with the 
most complete data among all manufacturers (i.e. with listed prices each year). We 
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used unit prices, which are per gram, per milliliter, or per piece (e.g. pill), because 
some drugs in our sample are consumed daily whereas others are taken as needed. 
When the selected drug manufacturer did not list the price in certain years, we 
determined the price of the cheapest version of the same dose from a different 
manufacturer. Thus, for example, if the FDA required UDI compliance for a drug in 
2009 and only one manufacturer had a price listed in 2007 and 2008, but the same 
manufacturer had no price listed in either 2010 or 2011, we determined the lowest 
listed price in 2010 and 2011 of a different manufacturer. 
To identify the before and after time point, for drugs approved voluntarily, 
we used the year of approval, whereas for drugs facing UDI action, we used the 
compliance date stated in the warning letters, since in the time between the warning 
letter issuance and compliance date, some manufacturers may have discontinued 
unapproved drugs while others may have received approval for previously 
unapproved drugs. When a drug was approved through a manufacturer’s voluntary 
compliance and other manufacturers subsequently faced UDI action, we used the 
date of the UDI warning letter compliance. 
In addition, where available, we identified the specific manufacturers to 
which the FDA sent UDI warning letters or that were labeled as previously 
“marketed without an approved NDA” in Drugs@FDA. We used the Redbook to 
examine the price changes immediately before and after the date that these specific 
manufacturers faced regulatory action or obtained approval for the drugs. 
 
U.S. Drug Shortages 
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We used the University of Utah’s Drug Information Service drug shortage 
dataset from January 1, 2004 to December 31, 2015. A shortage is defined as a 
supply issue that affects how a pharmacy prepares or dispenses a drug product that 
influences patient care when prescribers must use an alternative agent.62 The Drug 
Information Service publishes critical drug shortage information on a public website 
(www.ashp.org/shortage) hosted by the American Society of Health-System 
Pharmacists and receives voluntary reports of drug shortages via a reporting 
feature on the website. Clinical pharmacists at the service confirm each reported 
shortage by determining all potential manufacturers of a reported drug shortage 
and all drug presentation National Drug Codes (NDCs). Each manufacturer is 
contacted to determine which NDCs are in shortage at a national level. A shortage is 
considered resolved when all suppliers have all presentations available or have 
discontinued their products, or when FDA reports on its website63 that the shortage 
has been resolved. 
For each drug, we determined whether there was a shortage during the two 
years before and after the date of UDI regulatory action or approval through 
voluntary compliance. For both before and after this date, if there was a shortage, 
we determined the median duration of the shortage in days for each drug. Shortages 
beginning and ending on the same day or lasting fewer than 7 days were excluded 
from the calculation of shortage duration because these shortages signify that the 
drug was withdrawn from the market, and the true shortage end date cannot be 
determined. To identify the before and after time point, for drugs approved 
voluntarily, we used the year of approval, whereas for drugs facing UDI action, since 
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a shortage could ensue immediately after a manufacturer discontinued the drug, we 
used the date that the warning letter was issued. When a drug was approved 
through a manufacturer’s voluntary compliance and other manufacturers 
subsequently faced UDI action, we used the issue date of the UDI warning letter. For 
each drug, there may have been multiple shortages reported by different 
manufacturers; if these shortages overlapped in time, it was counted as only one. 
Each shortage was attributed to the year in which the shortage was active. For 
example, if a shortage began in October 2009 and ended in March 2011, it was 
counted for the years 2009, 2010, and 2011. 
 
Statistical Analysis 
We used descriptive statistics to characterize the sample of included drugs 
and the clinical evidence that supported applications for drugs approved after 2006 
through either voluntary compliance or after issuance of UDI warning letters. We 
used signed rank sum and χ2 tests to compare changes in prices and shortages of 
each drug. All statistical tests were two-sided and used a p-value of 0.05 for 
significance. All analyses were performed using Microsoft Excel 2010 (Microsoft 
Corp.; Redmond, WA) and Stata 12.0 (StatCorp; College Station, TX). 
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Results 
Analysis A: Generic Drug Approvals Since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act 
Between October 1, 1984 and December 31, 2015, the FDA approved 417 
NDAs for drug products in tablet or capsule formulation. Among these, 185 (44%) 
are still protected by active patents or other exclusivity prohibiting bioequivalent 
generic drug approvals and 22 (5%) have been discontinued for safety or 
effectiveness reasons. Among the remaining 210 drug products eligible for generic 
drug competition, 163 (78%) are currently marketed and 47 (22%) have been 
discontinued. The FDA granted priority review to 82 (39%) and designated 33 
(16%) as orphan drugs at the time of approval. Cardiovascular disease, diabetes 
mellitus, or hyperlipidemia were the most common approved indications (n=55 
[26%]) (Table 3). 
 
Table 3. New Drug Products (Eligible for Generic Competition) Approved by 
the US Food and Drug Administration After September 30, 1984 
 No (%) 
New Drug Products (n = 210)  
Availability 
Currently Marketed 163 (77.6) 
Discontinued 47 (22.4) 
Priority Review 
Yes 82 (39.0) 
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No 128 (61.0) 
Orphan Drug Designation 
Yes 33 (15.7) 
No 177 (84.3) 
Therapeutic Category 
Autoimmune/musculoskeletal  20 (9.5) 
Cancer 11 (5.2) 
Cardiovascular, diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia 55 (26.2) 
Infectious disease 37 (17.6) 
Neurology 26 (12.4) 
Psychiatry  25 (11.9) 
Other 36 (17.1) 
Approval Year 
1984-89 40 (19.0) 
1990-94 53 (25.2) 
1995-99 81 (38.6) 
2000-Present 36 (17.1) 
 
 
Number of Generic Drug Approvals 
Among the 210 drug products eligible for generic drug competition, there 
was no bioequivalent generic drug approval for 36 (17%) (Table 4). Among the 
remaining 174 with at least one generic drug approval, 16 had three generic drug 
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approvals, 9 had two generic drug approvals, and 16 had only one generic drug 
approval. Thus, 37% (77 of 210) of drug products had three or fewer bioequivalent 
generic drugs approved (Figure 3). Among drugs with at least one generic drug 
approval, the median number of generic drug approvals was 7 (IQR, 4-12). 
 
Table 4. Proportion of New Drug Products Approved After 1984 with Generic 
Drug Approvals, Stratified by Availability, Priority Review, Orphan Drug 
Designation, Therapeutic Category, and Approval Year 
Characteristic 
No. (%) 
At least 1 generic 
drug approval 
(n=174) 
4 or more generic 
drug approvals 
(n=133) 
Availability 
Currently Marketed (n=163) 142 (87.1) 109 (66.9) 
Discontinued (n=47) 32 (68.1) 24 (51.1) 
P value 0.002 0.05 
Priority Review 
Yes (n=82) 61 (74.4) 44 (53.7) 
No (n=128) 113 (88.3) 89 (69.5) 
P value 0.01 0.02 
Orphan Drug Designation 
Yes (n=33) 18 (54.5) 9 (27.3) 
No (n=177) 156 (88.1) 124 (70.1) 
P value < 0.001 < 0.001 
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Therapeutic Category 
Autoimmune/musculoskeletal 
(n=20) 
16 (80.0) 15 (75.0) 
Cancer (n=11) 7 (63.6) 3 (27.3) 
Cardiovascular, diabetes mellitus, 
hyperlipidemia (n=55) 51 (92.7) 41 (74.5) 
Infectious disease (n=37) 25 (67.6) 17 (45.9) 
Neurology (n=26) 26 (100.0) 20 (76.9) 
Psychiatry (n=25) 25 (100.0) 22 (88.0) 
Other (n=36) 24 (66.7) 15 (41.7) 
P value < 0.001 < 0.001 
Approval Year 
1984-89 (n=40) 31 (77.5) 22 (55.0) 
1990-94 (n=53) 44 (83.0) 36 (67.9) 
1995-99 (n=81) 67 (82.7) 54 (66.7) 
2000-Present (n=36) 32 (88.9) 21 (58.3) 
P value 0.63 0.48 
 
 
Figure 3. Generic Drug Approvals for Novel Therapeutics Approved by the US 
Food and Drug Administration Eligible for Generic Competition 
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Time to Generic Drug Approvals 
On the date of first generic drug approval, the median number of FDA-
approved generic drugs was 1 (IQR, 1-3) (Figure 4). At 180 days after first generic 
drug approval, at which point additional generic drugs could be approved if the 
initial generic drug won 180-day exclusivity, a median of 2 generic drugs was 
approved (IQR, 1-6). At one year after first generic drug approval, the median 
number of total generic drugs approved was 3 (IQR, 1-7), and at five years the 
median number was 6 (IQR, 3-11). At 10 years, the median number of total 
approved generic drugs was 7 (IQR, 4-11), and at 15 years, the number was also 7 
(IQR, 4-12). 
 
Figure 4. Median Number of Generic Drug Approvals Among All Drug Products 
FDA-Approved After September 30, 1984 with at Least One Generic Drug 
Approval by the FDA 
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Generic Drug Approval by Drug Product Characteristics 
Currently marketed drug products were more likely to have at least one 
generic drug approval as compared to discontinued drug products (142 of 163 
[87%] vs. 32 of 47 [68%]; p=0.002). Drug products that received FDA priority 
review were less likely to have a generic drug approval when compared with those 
that did not (61 of 82 [74%] vs. 113 of 128 [88%]; p=0.009), as were orphan-
designated drugs when compared with non-orphan-designated drugs (18 of 33 
[55%] vs. 156 of 177 [88%]; p<0.001). The likelihood of generic drug approval 
varied significantly by therapeutic category (p<0.001), with neurological drugs (26 
of 26) and psychiatric drugs (25 of 25) having the highest rates and oncological 
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drugs having the lowest (7 of 11 [64%]). The likelihood of generic drug approval did 
not vary significantly by the initial approval year of the drug product (p=0.63). 
Currently marketed drug products were also more likely to have four or 
more generic drug approvals as compared to discontinued drug products (109 of 
163 [67%] vs. 24 of 47 [51%]; p=0.05). Drug products that received FDA priority 
review were less likely to have four or more generic drug approvals when compared 
with those that did not (44 of 82 [54%] vs. 89 of 128 [70%]; p=0.02), as were 
orphan-designated drugs when compared with non-orphan-designated drugs (9 of 
33 [27%] vs. 124 of 177 [70%]; p<0.001). The likelihood of four or more generic 
drug approvals varied significantly by therapeutic category (p<0.001), with 
psychiatric drugs having the highest rates (22 of 25 [88%]) and oncological drugs 
having the lowest (3 of 11 [27%]). The likelihood of four or more generic drug 
approvals did not vary significantly by the initial approval year of the drug product 
(p=0.48). 
Among the drug products with at least one generic drug approval, there were 
no differences in the median number of generic drugs between currently marketed 
and discontinued drug products (8 [IQR, 4-13] vs. 5.5 [IQR, 3.5-8]; p=0.06), or 
between drug products that did and did not receive FDA priority review (6 [IQR, 3-
11] vs. 8 [IQR, 4-12]; p=0.19). Drug products with orphan designation had 
significantly fewer generic drugs approved than those without (3.5 [IQR, 2-7] vs. 8 
[IQR, 4-12]; p<0.01). Rates of generic drug approvals varied significantly by 
therapeutic category (p<0.01), with psychiatric disease having the highest median 
number (10 [IQR, 6-15]) and cancer having the lowest (3 [IQR, 2-17]).  
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Analysis B: Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for drug 
prices and shortages 
 
Characteristics of All Drugs Facing UDI  
Since the UDI was launched in 2006, 12 previously unapproved prescription 
drugs have received FDA approval through voluntary compliance, whereas 22 have 
faced UDI regulatory action, for a total of 34 drugs included in our study (Figure 5). 
Of the 22 drugs facing UDI action, 6 had no FDA-approved versions as of September 
1, 2016, either before or after UDI action; 9 drugs had at least one FDA-approved 
version prior to UDI regulatory action, but no NDA approvals after. The remaining 7 
drugs had at least one NDA approval after UDI action. 
Of the 34 drugs, 22 (65%) were first introduced into the U.S. market before 
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act in 1938 (Table 5). For each year from 2006 to 
2015, between 1 and 6 previously unapproved drugs received FDA approval 
through either voluntary compliance or after facing UDI regulatory action, with a 
median of 3.5 (Interquartile Range [IQR], 2-4). These drugs have a range of primary 
indications, including 11 (32%) for pain-control, 6 (18%) ophthalmologic solutions, 
and 4 (12%) for management of upper respiratory symptoms or allergies. 
 
Figure 5. Sample Construction of previously Unapproved Prescription Drug 
Products that Faced UDI Regulatory Action or Received Voluntary Approval 
after 2006. 
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Table 5. Characteristics of Previously Unapproved Drug Products Facing UDI 
Regulatory Action or Receiving Voluntary Approval (n=34). 
 
Drug Product 
Year of First 
Market 
AvailabilityA 
Primary FDA-
approved 
Indication(s) 
Voluntary 
Compliance 
or 
Regulatory 
Action 
Year of 
Voluntary 
Compliance or 
Regulatory 
Action 
Atropine sulfate 
ophthalmic 
solution 
Before 1938 
Cycloplegia, 
pupillary 
dilation, 
ambylopia 
Voluntary 2014 
Balanced salt 
solution 
(ophthalmic) 
1960s 
Eye fluid 
replacement 
during surgical 
procedures 
Regulatory 2008 
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Carbinoxamine Early 1950s 
Seasonal and 
perennial 
allergic 
rhinitis, 
vasomotor 
rhinitis 
Regulatory 2006 
Codeine 
phosphate 
combinations 
Before 1938 
Cough, 
symptoms of 
upper 
respiratory 
allergies or 
common cold 
Regulatory 2014 
Codeine 
phosphate 
injection 
Before 1938 
Mild to 
moderately 
severe pain in 
adults 
Regulatory 2014 
Codeine sulfate 
tablet 
Before 1938 
Mild to 
moderately 
severe pain in 
adults 
Voluntary 2009 
Colchicine 
injection 
Before 1962 
Acute gout 
attacks 
Regulatory 2008 
Colchicine tablet Before 1938 Gout flares Voluntary 2009 
Dihydrocodeine 
bitartrate 
combinations 
Before 1938 
Mild to 
moderately 
severe pain in 
adults 
Regulatory 2014 
Epinephrine 
injection/syring
e 
Before 1938 
Allergic 
reactions, 
anaphylaxis 
Regulatory 2010 
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Ergotamine-
containing 
product 
Before 1938 
Vascular 
headaches, 
migraine 
Regulatory 2007 
Fluorescein 
injection 
Before 1938 
Diagnostic 
fluorescein 
angiography, 
angioscopy of 
retina and iris 
vasculature 
Regulatory 2012 
Freshkote 
ophthalmic 
solution 
Unknown Dry eye Regulatory 2012 
 Hydrocodone Before 1938 Cough, pain Regulatory 2007 
Hydromorphone 
injection 
Before 1938 
Management of 
pain where 
opioid 
analgesic is 
appropriate 
Voluntary 2011 
Hydromorphone 
tablet 
Before 1938 
Management of 
pain where 
opioid 
analgesic is 
appropriate 
Regulatory 2009 
Levothyroxine 
injection 
Early 1960s 
Myxedema 
coma 
Regulatory 2006 
Morphine 
sulfate 
immediate-
release tablet 
Before 1938 
Moderate to 
severe acute 
and chronic 
pain where 
opioid 
analgesic is 
appropriate 
Voluntary 2008 
Morphine 
sulfate injection 
Before 1938 Pain not 
responsive to 
Voluntary 2011 
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non-narcotic 
analgesics 
Morphine 
sulfate solution 
Before 1938 
Moderate to 
severe acute 
and chronic 
pain in opioid-
tolerant 
patients 
Voluntary 2008 
Nitroglycerin 
sublingual tablet 
Before 1938 
Acute relief of 
an attack or 
acute 
prophylaxis of 
angina pectoris 
due to 
coronary 
artery disease 
Regulatory 2010 
Otic drugs Unknown 
Ear pain, 
infection, and 
inflammation 
Regulatory 2015 
Oxycodone 
immediate-
release tablet 
1939 
Acute and 
chronic 
moderate to 
severe pain 
when use of 
opioid 
analgesic is 
appropriate 
Regulatory 2009 
Oxycodone 
solution 
1939 
Moderate to 
severe pain in 
opioid tolerant 
patients 
Voluntary 2010 
Pancrelipase Before 1938 
Exocrine 
pancreatic 
insufficiency 
due to cystic 
Regulatory 2010 
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fibrosis or 
other 
conditions 
Papain-
containing 
topical drug 
Before 1962 
Debridement 
of necrotic 
tissue, 
liquefaction of 
slough in acute 
and chronic 
lesions 
Regulatory 2008 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride 
(IV solution) 
Before 1938 
Increase blood 
pressure in 
acute 
hypotensive 
states 
Voluntary 2012 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride 
(ophthalmic 
solution) 
Before 1938 
Pupillary 
dilation 
Voluntary 2013 
Pilocarpine 
hydrochloride 
ophthalmic 
solution 
Before 1938 
Reduction of 
elevated 
intraocular 
pressure, 
glaucoma 
Regulatory 2012 
Potassium 
chloride oral 
solution 
Before 1962 Hypokalemia Voluntary 2014 
Quinine Before 1938 
Uncomplicated 
Plasmodium 
falciparum 
malaria 
Regulatory 2007 
Sodium nitrite & 
sodium 
thiosulfate 
injection 
Before 1962 
Cyanide 
poisoning 
Regulatory 2013 
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Trimethobenza
mide 
hydrochloride 
suppository 
Before 1962 
Nausea and 
vomiting 
Regulatory 2007 
Vasopressin Before 1938 
Vasodilatory 
shock 
Voluntary 2014 
A For many drugs, the exact date of first availability could not be found. 
 
Clinical Evidence of Safety and Efficacy 
Nineteen drugs had at least one NDA approval after 2006 (Figure 5), either 
after UDI action or as part of voluntary compliance. Evidence provided in the NDA to 
support efficacy (Table 6) was based on a newly conducted clinical trial for 2 (11%) 
drugs, a literature review for 6 (32%), demonstrated bioequivalence to a previously 
approved drug product with the same active ingredient for 6 (32%), and both a 
literature review and demonstrated bioequivalence to previous drug products for 5 
(26%). Evidence provided in the NDA to support safety (Table 6) was based on a 
newly conducted clinical trial for 2 (11%) drugs, a literature review for 5 (26%), 
demonstrated bioequivalence to a previously approved drug product with the same 
active ingredient for 7 (37%), and both a literature review and demonstrated 
bioequivalence to previous drug products for 5 (26%) drugs. 
 
Table 6. Clinical Evidence Supporting NDA Approval of Prescription Drugs 
after Facing UDI Regulatory Action or Receiving Voluntary Approval (n=19)A. 
 
Drug Efficacy Evidence Safety Evidence 
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Atropine sulfate 
ophthalmic 
solution 
Literature review of 57 studies 
from 1931-2013; 8 studies 
summarized in application (3 
randomized, 2 double-blind, 
average 173 subjects) 
Literature review and statement of 
long history and frequent use 
Carbinoxamine 
2 bioequivalence studies; reviewed 
4 studies from 1954-1956 (2 
placebo-controlled, average 105 
subjects) involved in DESI review 
of initial carbinoxamine product 
Safety events from 2 bioequivalence 
studies; reviewed side effects in 4 
studies from 1954-1956 from DESI 
review 
Codeine 
phosphate 
combinations 
2 bioequivalence studies 
2 bioequivalence studies; summary 
of data from 2 clinical pharmacology 
studies, postmarketing spontaneous 
adverse events report, and a 
literature survey 
Codeine sulfate 
tablet 
5 bioequivalence studies, literature 
review of 159 studies; 6 studies 
from 1970-1978 used to support 
approval (all randomized, double-
blind, placebo-controlled, average 
127 subjects) 
Based on safety reported in labeling 
of reference product (codeine in 
Tylenol #3) 
Colchicine tablet 
Conducted clinical trial 
(randomized, double-blind, 
placebo-controlled, 1-week long, 
185 subjects); referenced 1 clinical 
trial from 1987 in published 
literature (randomized, double-
Conducted clinical trial; data from 14 
pharmacokinetic studies (total 314 
subjects); literature review (3 
randomized controlled studies and 
21 uncontrolled studies); review of 
FDA and World Health Organization 
40 
 
blind, placebo-controlled, 43 
subjects) 
postmarketing adverse event report 
databases 
Epinephrine 
injection/syringe 
Recommended dosing based on 
published literature and 
established clinical practice; based 
on previous findings for 
epinephrine in treatment of 
allergic reactions and anaphylaxis 
Based on previous findings for 
epinephrine in treatment of allergic 
reactions and anaphylaxis 
Hydrocodone 
1 bioequivalence study; literature 
review 
1 bioequivalence study; literature 
review (5 studies); review of adverse 
events reporting system database 
Hydromorphone 
injection 
None - based on prior approval of 
hydromorphone products 
None - based on prior approval of 
hydromorphone products 
Levothyroxine 
injection 
Literature review of 45 studies 
from 1953-2007 (1 open-label trial 
involving 14 subjects) 
Literature review of 40 studies from 
1964-2004 (1 open-label trial 
involving 14 subjects) 
Morphine sulfate 
immediate-
release tablet 
3 bioequivalence studies 3 bioequivalence studies 
Morphine sulfate 
injection 
Previous findings for reference 
product, but no bioequivalence 
studies; literature review of 59 
Previous findings for reference 
product, but no bioequivalence 
studies; literature review of 59 
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studies involving randomized 
controlled trials 
studies involving randomized 
controlled trials 
Morphine Sulfate 
solution 
1 bioequivalence study 
Previous findings from reference 
product 
Oxycodone 
immediate-
release tablet 
2 bioequivalence studies; literature 
review of 10 studies 
2 bioequivalence studies; literature 
review of 10 studies 
Oxycodone 
solution 
1 bioequivalence study 1 bioequivalence study 
Pancrelipase 
1 clinical trial (randomized, 
double-blind, placebo-controlled, 
length of 2 weeks, 32 subjects); 
literature review of 15 
randomized, double-blind, 
placebo-controlled studies 
(average 40 subjects, 23 days in 
length) 
1 clinical trial (randomized, double-
blind, placebo-controlled, length of 2 
weeks, 32 subjects) 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride (IV 
solution) 
Literature review only; no review 
of protocols, study reports, 
datasets, case reports, or site visit; 
however, approved based on 
generally consistent conclusions 
overall 
Literature review; review of 
pharmacovigilance database; review 
of spontaneous reporting system and 
adverse event reporting system 
databases 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride 
(ophthalmic 
solution) 
Literature review of 5 studies from 
1967-2004 (average 24 subjects) 
Literature review of 25 studies from 
1939-2010 (8 clinical trials, average 
52 subjects) 
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Potassium 
chloride oral 
solution 
Previous findings for reference 
product, but no bioequivalence 
studies; literature review 
Previous findings for reference 
product, but no bioequivalence 
studies; literature review 
Vasopressin 
Literature review of 19 studies 
from 1997-2012 (11 randomized, 
8 double-blind, average 62 
patients) 
Literature review of 19 studies from 
1997-2012 (average 42 subjects) 
A Clinical evidence was reviewed for the first NDA approval after 2006 through either voluntary 
compliance or after issuance of UDI warning letters. 
 
Impact of the UDI on Prices 
Of the 34 drugs facing UDI action or receiving approval through voluntary 
compliance, 26 had prices listed in the Redbook during the two years before and 
after UDI action or voluntary approval. Among these 26 drugs, the average price 
during the two years before and the average price during the two years after UDI 
action or voluntary approval increased by a median of 37% (IQR, 23%-204%; 
p<0.001) (Table 7). In addition, 10 drugs had specific manufacturers with Redbook 
prices listed from immediately before and after the date of UDI warning letter 
compliance or date of approval with a label of previously “marketed without an 
approved NDA” in Drugs@FDA. These 10 manufacturers increased drug prices from 
immediately before obtaining approval to immediately after by a median of 122% 
(IQR, 10%-351%; p=0.01). 
 
Table 7. Average Wholesale Unit Price of Previously Unapproved Prescription 
Drugs During the Two Years Before and After UDI Regulatory Action or 
Voluntary Approval (n=26) and Specific Manufacturers’ Drug Unit Prices 
Immediately Before and After (n=10). 
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Drug 
Year of 
UDI 
Complian
ce or 
Voluntary 
Approval 
Unit 
Price 
(Before)
A 
Unit 
Price 
(After) 
Chang
e in 
Unit 
Price 
(%) 
Manufact
urer Unit 
Price 
(Before) 
Manufactu
rer Unit 
Price 
(After) 
Change 
in Unit 
Price 
(%) 
Atropine 
sulfate 
ophthalmic 
solution 
2014 $3.42 $3.88 13 $2.22 $6.35 187 
Balanced salt 
solution 
(ophthalmic) 
2008 $0.17 $0.18 6 - - - 
Codeine 
phosphate 
combinations 
2014 $0.80 $1.11 38 - - - 
Codeine 
sulfate tablet 
2010 $0.43 $0.46 6 - - - 
Colchicine 
tablet 
2010 $0.33 $5.82 1664 $0.17 $5.82 3324 
Dihydrocodein
e bitartrate 
combinations 
2014 $2.63 $3.36 28 - - - 
Epinephrine 
injection/syri
nge 
2010 $0.49 $1.15 136 $1.44 $2.28 58 
Ergotamine-
containing 
product 
2007 $107.38 $138.60 29 $1.58 $1.89 20 
Fluorescein 
injection 
2012 $6.60 $8.94 36 - - - 
Hydrocodone 2007 $0.20 $0.26 26 - - - 
Hydromorpho
ne injection 
2011 $1.20 $1.34 12 $1.10 $1.01 -9 
Hydromorpho
ne tablet 
2009 $0.67 $0.85 27 - - - 
Levothyroxine 
injection 
2006 $7.20 $18.00 150 $50.93 $180.00 253 
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Morphine 
sulfate 
immediate-
release tablet 
2009 $0.18 $0.20 9 - - - 
Morphine 
sulfate 
injection 
2011 $0.23 $0.59 154 $0.47 $0.48 2 
Morphine 
sulfate 
solution 
2010 $0.08 $0.08 5 - - - 
Nitroglycerin 
sublingual 
tablet 
2010 $0.15 $0.19 23 - - - 
Oxycodone 
immediate-
release tablet 
2009 $0.35 $0.80 129 $0.57 $0.61 7 
Oxycodone 
solution 
2010 $1.15 $5.55 383 - - - 
Pancrelipase 2010 $0.46 $0.70 51 - - - 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride 
(IV solution) 
2012 $2.98 $14.40 383 $2.98 $14.40 383 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride 
(ophthalmic 
solution) 
2013 $1.68 $7.50 346 - - - 
Pilocarpine 
hydrochloride 
ophthalmic 
solution 
2012 $1.94 $6.20 220 - - - 
Potassium 
chloride oral 
solution 
2014 $0.02 $0.05 223 - - - 
Quinine 2007 $3.31 $4.06 23 - - - 
Vasopressin 2014 $2.18 $134.20 6070 $5.13 $59.40 1058 
A We report unit prices, which are per gram, per milliliter, or per piece (e.g. pill), because some drugs 
in our sample are consumed daily whereas others are taken as needed; manufacturer-specific 
analyses are focused on the manufacturers to which the FDA sent UDI warning letters or that were 
labeled as previously “marketed without an approved NDA” in Drugs@FDA. 
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Impact of the UDI on Shortages 
Among the 34 drugs facing UDI action or receiving approval through 
voluntary compliance, 30 (88%) experienced at least one shortage between 2004 
and 2015. Of the 34 drugs, 17 (50%) experienced a shortage in the two years before 
voluntary approval or UDI action, and 25 (74%) in the two years after (p=0.05). 
Three drugs had a shortage that began and ended on the same day, and were thus 
excluded for the shortage duration analysis; among the remaining 31 drugs, the 
median shortage duration for drugs in the 2 years before voluntary approval or UDI 
action was 31 days (IQR, 0-339), whereas the median shortage duration in the 2 
years after was 217 days (IQR, 0-406; p=0.05) (Table 8). 
 
Table 8. National Drug Shortages of Previously Unapproved Drug Products 
During the Two Years Before and After Facing UDI Regulatory Action or 
Receiving Voluntary Approval (n=34). 
 
Drug 
Year of UDI 
Issuance or 
Voluntary 
Approval 
Shortage Days 
(Before)A 
Shortage Days 
(After)A 
Atropine sulfate 
ophthalmic solution 
2014 No Shortage 406 
Balanced salt solution 
(ophthalmic) 
2008 No Shortage 27 
Carbinoxamine 2006 No Shortage No Shortage 
Codeine phosphate 
combinations 
2014 428 386 
Codeine phosphate 
injection 
2014 No Shortage No Shortage 
Codeine sulfate tablet 2009 No Shortage 357 
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Colchicine injection 2008 No Shortage 
Shortage, number 
of days not 
determinable 
Colchicine tablet 2010 339 No Shortage 
Dihydrocodeine 
bitartrate 
combinations 
2014 No Shortage No Shortage 
Epinephrine 
injection/syringe 
2010 31 564 
Ergotamine-containing 
product 
2007 No Shortage 217 
Fluorescein injection 2011 147 37 
Freshkote ophthalmic 
solution 
2011 No Shortage No Shortage 
Hydrocodone 2007 No Shortage 310 
Hydromorphone 
injection 
2011 717 628 
Hydromorphone tablet 2009 No Shortage 153 
Levothyroxine 
injection 
2006 No Shortage 383 
Morphine sulfate 
immediate-release 
tablet 
2009 47 No Shortage 
Morphine sulfate 
injection 
2011 595 730 
Morphine sulfate 
solution 
2009 39 526 
Nitroglycerin 
sublingual tablet 
2010 400 No Shortage 
Otic drugs 2015 153 5 
Oxycodone immediate-
release tablet 
2009 82 554 
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Oxycodone solution 2010 63 405 
Pancrelipase 2004 No Shortage 174 
Papain-containing 
topical drug 
2008 
Shortage, number 
of days not 
determinable 
126 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride (IV 
solution) 
2012 436 649 
Phenylephrine 
hydrochloride 
(ophthalmic solution) 
2013 No Shortage 311 
Pilocarpine 
hydrochloride 
ophthalmic solution 
2012 No Shortage 129 
Potassium chloride 
oral solution 
2014 No Shortage No Shortage 
Quinine 2006 264 No Shortage 
Sodium nitrite & 
sodium thiosulfate 
injection 
2012 597 645 
Trimethobenzamide 
hydrochloride 
suppository 
2007 No Shortage 
Shortage, number 
of days not 
determinable 
Vasopressin 2014 730 376 
A “Shortage, number of days not determinable”: shortage duration could not be estimated because 
shortage lasted fewer than 7 days or began and ended on same day, signifying that the shortage end 
date is unknown. 
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Discussion 
Study Findings and Context 
This study provides a comprehensive overview of the competitiveness of U.S. 
generic drug markets and its implications for drug prices and shortages through two 
analyses: a systematic characterization of the number of generic versions available 
for drug products approved by the FDA between 1984 (when the Hatch-Waxman 
Act was enacted) and 2015 (Analysis A) and a detailed evaluation of the unintended 
consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative for prices and shortages of 
old drugs that had previously never formally been approved by the FDA (Analysis 
B). 
 
Overall Generic Competition Since 1984 
Among all brand-name, tablet or capsule drugs approved by the FDA since 
1984 and eligible for generic competition, we found that over one-third had three or 
fewer FDA-approved generic manufacturers, including nearly one-fifth with no 
generics. Furthermore, the likelihood of generic drug availability varied by key drug 
product characteristics, including priority review status, orphan drug status, and 
therapeutic category for which the drug is indicated. Orphan drugs, which are used 
to treat rare diseases in the U.S., were significantly less likely to have any generic 
versions and less likely to have four or more generics. Moreover, orphan drugs had a 
significantly lower median number of generic approvals. The fact that orphan drugs 
are less competitive is unsurprising, given the smaller market size and potential 
profits for these drugs. 
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Four generic versions of each drug were available a median of two years 
after the first generic approval, suggesting that there is some lag between the time 
when generic drugs are eligible to enter the market and the time when there are 
sufficient numbers of generic versions to significantly decrease drug prices. 
Furthermore, generic markets seem to reach a saturation level ten years after the 
first generic drug is approved, at which point a median of seven generic drugs have 
been approved.   
Prior research on competitiveness of generic drug markets has relied on 
alternate measures to examine pharmaceutical competition, including the speed of 
generic penetration into the market, the time between brand-name approval and 
first generic launch (i.e. market exclusivity period), and the number of generic 
patent challenges.17-19,64,65 One study determined the average number of generic 
manufacturers for only cancer drugs between 2001 and 2007.66 A more recent 
article discusses specific off-patent essential medicines that have increased 
dramatically in price as a consequence of weak competition, and lists additional 
essential medicines that may also be vulnerable to price increases.67 Our study 
extends these findings by considering all brand-name drugs eligible for generic 
competition, while also examining the number of subsequent generic drug 
approvals. 
The fact that more than 80% of brand-name drugs were found to have at 
least one bioequivalent generic illustrates the success of U.S. drug policy in 
promoting generic drug availability through the Hatch-Waxman Act and automatic 
drug substitution laws. However, more than one-third had three or fewer FDA-
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approved generic drugs, which raises troubling questions about the potential gaps 
in generic competition and the impact on drug prices and accessibility of generic 
medicines for patients. We selected four generic drug approvals as a sufficient 
threshold for stimulation of price competition based on prior research.6,30,32 
 
Consequences of the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative 
In our evaluation of the Unapproved Drugs Initiative, we identified 34 
previously unapproved prescription drugs that either faced UDI regulatory action or 
received approval after 2006 through manufacturers’ voluntary compliance; among 
these drugs, both prices and shortages increased significantly after UDI action. 
Specific manufacturers dramatically raised prices after obtaining approval for drugs 
they were already marketing without approval. In addition, nearly all drugs that 
received new approval through voluntary compliance or after UDI regulatory action 
were supported by literature reviews and bioequivalence to older drugs, not new 
clinical trials. These findings suggest that the UDI had the unintended consequence 
of increasing both drug prices and shortages, while rarely generating additional 
clinical evidence of safety or efficacy. 
Of course, ensuring the safety and efficacy of all marketed drugs is an 
important FDA responsibility and is essential for high-quality patient care. 
Unapproved drugs can present real dangers as they may be unsafe, ineffective, 
improperly labeled, of low quality due to substandard manufacturing processes, 
confusing due to unregulated trade names, or difficult to monitor after they are on 
the market; they also may challenge the integrity of the FDA drug approval system.37 
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However, our findings suggest that the approval process itself did not necessarily 
establish that these drugs were more safe or effective than had been understood 
pre-approval. This may be acceptable, considering physicians have been using these 
drugs for decades. However, satisfying these FDA approval requirements may have 
had negative consequences for patient care. 
 
Implications 
This study has important implications for patient access to medicines and for 
efforts to prevent price increases of old, off-patent drugs with generic versions. 
Once a brand-name drug’s patents expire, generic medicines undoubtedly and 
quickly become available at a significantly lower price that often remains low. 
However, if drugs do not experience enough of a price reduction or suddenly 
increase in price, patients may no longer be able to afford their medications, with 
important implications both for adherence and overall health outcomes.7,8 This 
section includes a case study of naloxone to illustrate the dynamics of limited 
generic competition, increasing prices, and consequences for patient access. 
Consequences for patients are similar for the UDI, which this study shows 
inadvertently increased drug prices and shortages of old drugs by reducing the 
number of the manufacturers. This section will elucidate the mechanisms by which 
the UDI allowed this to happen. 
There are several reasons for why specific drugs that have been available in 
generic form for years do not have sufficient competition to prevent increasing 
prices. This section discusses these explanatory factors, potential solutions to 
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increase the competitiveness of these drug markets, and regulatory steps to limit 
price increases. The suggested solutions for the UDI’s unintended consequences are 
more specific and discussed after. These steps are critical to stemming the growing 
trend of increasing generic drug prices and to maintaining patient access. 
 
Overall Generic Competition Since 1984 
Our findings suggest that more than one-third of drugs approved after 1984 
are vulnerable to increasing prices. Though investigating the prices of these specific 
drugs is outside the scope of the study, it is troubling that such a substantial 
proportion of drugs sold in the U.S. exist in monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions. 
Furthermore, these drugs are increasingly susceptible to dramatic price 
manipulation through pharmaceutical companies’ growing – and in sometimes 
principal – strategy of acquiring the rights to old drugs with few manufacturers and 
dramatically increasing prices.5,68 For example, after acquiring the rights to drugs, 
Turing increased pyrimethamine’s (brand: Daraprim) price by 5000% and Valeant 
increased the price of isoproterenol (brand: Isuprel) by over 3600%. More recently, 
Mylan faced Congressional investigations for raising the price of Epipen, an auto-
injector containing the century-old drug epinephrine, by 600% over the past 
decade. 
 
CASE IN POINT: NALOXONE 
One drug that has received comparatively less attention is naloxone, an 
antidote to opioid overdose. The case of naloxone serves as an illustrative example 
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for the dynamics of generic competition, highlighting key elements of the trend of 
increasing prices of off-patent drugs: limited generic competition, weak regulation, 
pharmaceutical companies’ opportunistic price-gouging, and patient affordability 
and accessibility. 
The Food and Drug Administration first approved naloxone in 1971 as an 
injection (Narcan) for reversing opioid intoxication or overdose. Although the 
brand-name version has been discontinued, generic versions of naloxone have been 
available since 1985, and today injections are available in two doses (0.4 mg per 
milliliter and 1 mg per milliliter; see Table 9). In 2014, the FDA fast-tracked 
approval of the first auto-injector formulation (Evzio), a fixed-dose single injection 
designed to allow people without medical training to reverse opioid overdose. In 
2015, the agency fast-tracked approval of the first nasal-spray formulation (also 
marketed as Narcan); previously, naloxone injections (larger vials of a 1-mg-per-
milliliter dose) had routinely been used off-label with an atomizer for nasal delivery. 
Each formulation of naloxone — two injection doses, Narcan nasal spray, and 
Evzio auto-injector — essentially has one supplier. Though there are three 
manufacturers with FDA approval for 0.4-mg-per-milliliter-dose injections, the vast 
majority are sold by Hospira, which has increased the price by 129% since 2012 
(Table 9). Only Amphastar manufactures 1-mg-per-milliliter injections, the dose 
used off-label as a nasal spray, which currently costs $39.60 after a 95% increase in 
September 2014. Newer, easier-to-use formulations are even more expensive. 
Narcan costs $150 for two nasal-spray doses. A two-dose Evzio package was priced 
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at $690 in 2014 but is $4,500 today, a price increase of more than 500% in just over 
2 years. 
 
Table 9. Recent and Current PricesA for Naloxone. 
 
Naloxone 
Product 
Dose and Form Manufacturer 
Previous 
Price (yr) 
2016 
Price 
Injectable or 
intranasal 
1 mg-per-milliliter vial 
(2 ml) (mucosal 
atomizer device 
separate) 
Amphastar 
$20.34 
(2009) 
$39.60 
Injectable 
0.4 mg-per-milliliter 
vial (10 ml) 
Hospira 
$62.29 
(2012) 
$142.49 
0.4 mg-per-milliliter 
vial (1 ml) 
Mylan 
$23.72 
(2014) 
$23.72 
0.4 mg-per-milliliter 
vial (1 ml) 
West-Ward 
$20.40 
(2015) 
$20.40 
Evzio auto-
injector 
Two-pack of single-use 
prefilled auto-injectors 
Kaleo 
(approved in 
2014) 
$690 
(2014) 
$4500 
Narcan 
nasal spray 
Two-pack of single-use 
intranasal devices 
Adapt 
(approved in 
2015) 
$150 
(2015) 
$150 
A Price information was obtained from Medi-Span Price Rx, a reference for drug data and pricing 
from Wolters Kluwer Clinical Drug Information. 
 
The small number of manufacturers has likely enabled this rapid increase in 
naloxone’s cost, which can have serious consequences for a particularly vulnerable 
patient population’s access to the life-saving drug. In combination with 
stigmatization and lack of familiarity with the treatment among clinicians and 
opioid users,69 the rising cost of naloxone may explain the relatively slow adoption 
of naloxone. Despite the growing need for naloxone70 and the increased focus on 
expanding the drug’s availability,71-73 between 2009 and 2015, the annual number of 
total naloxone vials/injections sold increased only from 2.8 million to 3.2 million.71 
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The rising cost of naloxone has affected local and state governments throughout the 
U.S.,74 and despite Congressional investigations,75 manufacturers have continued to 
take advantage of naloxone’s rising demand, limited competition, and the absence of 
strong regulation by increasing prices. 
 
EXPLANATORY FACTORS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Several factors contribute to limited generic competition for specific drug 
markets, including decreased attractiveness of specific markets due to lower profit 
potential, FDA regulation and application backlogs, and anticompetitive strategies 
employed by brand-name companies. A number of solutions could help to increase 
the competitiveness of these markets and improve regulation of drug prices. 
First, limited profit potential for specific drugs can dissuade generic 
manufacturers from entering markets76 and lead manufacturers to exit existing 
generic markets.35 For instance, this study demonstrates that there is significantly 
less competition for orphan drugs, which treat rare diseases with smaller patient 
populations and smaller profit potentials. In addition, over time, for markets that 
already have substantial numbers of generics, manufacturers may decide that there 
is no longer an incentive to continue to sell specific drugs.35,77 Lower potential 
profits may also explain the increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions of 
generic companies, which further decreases overall competition.12,78 
Second, more than 60% of all ANDA applications are currently in the midst of 
the approval process, awaiting information from either the FDA or the applicant to 
proceed.79 To its credit, the FDA has recently cleared its backlog of applications by 
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responding, at least initially, to most of these applications,80 but the generic drugs 
cannot be made available until final decisions are made. Many of these final 
decisions rest on responses from industry as opposed to the FDA. Greater resources 
to the Office of Generic Drugs in the renewal of the generic drug user fees act could 
also improve FDA review times.81  
There are steps that the FDA could take to help increase competitiveness in 
generic markets. The FDA already prioritizes generic drug applications for drug 
products for which there is no generic version available; for “sole-source” drug 
products, meaning only one generic version is marketed; and for drugs in 
shortage.82 However, drugs with three or fewer manufacturers currently serving the 
U.S. market are also in danger of entering into a shortage, often due to 
manufacturing difficulties or shortages of raw materials.34 Thus, the FDA should also 
prioritize and expedite review of generic drug applications for drugs with three or 
fewer manufacturers. Similarly, dramatic price increases, which are more likely 
among drugs in monopolistic or oligopolistic conditions, can make essential drugs 
inaccessible to patients—creating a de facto shortage—suggesting that the FDA also 
currently has the legal authority to prioritize applications for generic drugs that 
have increased in price two-fold or more in the past two years. 
Third, to protect their profits and maintain monopolies, brand-name 
companies engage in innumerable strategies to avoid generic competition. One 
strategy employed by brand-name companies is to “evergreen” or “product-hop,” 
meaning that they make slight changes in dosages and formulations of existing 
drugs or form combination treatments, which allows for extended patents and 
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exclusivity wherein generic companies are barred from competing.83 Older 
formulations that have generic versions often cannot be automatically substituted 
for the newer brand-name formulation. For example, as the patent was expiring for 
Aricept (generic: donepezil), which was available in 5 mg and 10 mg doses to treat 
Alzheimer’s disease, the manufacturer of Aricept inexplicably received approval 
from the FDA for a 23 mg dose.84 This new dosage showed only a small statistically 
significant improvement in cognition when compared to the 10 mg dose, but as a 
result of new approval, the drug as a 23 mg dose could no longer be automatically 
substituted at the pharmacy level with 5 mg and 10 mg generic versions of 
donepezil. This can render prior markets with generic manufacturers – such as for 
donepezil 5 mg and 10 mg doses – obsolete, since heavy pharmaceutical marketing 
may convince doctors and patients that the older formulations are less effective. 
In addition, brand-name pharmaceutical companies often refuse to provide 
generic manufacturers with samples required to conduct bioequivalency studies in 
order to receive FDA approval.85 Generic companies then must file litigation against 
the brand-name company, which is a time-intensive and costly process. Newly 
proposed legislation in Congress attempts to stem these practices.86 
Various regulatory steps could also help to encourage competitiveness and 
control generic drug prices. One solution is for the federal government to conduct 
price negotiations and purchase large quantities of pharmaceuticals, which would 
create stable demand that might motivate additional companies to begin 
manufacturing the medication — a strategy that’s been used for vaccine 
manufacturing.87 Second, governments could invoke federal law 28 U.S.C. section 
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1498 to contract with a manufacturer to act on behalf of the United States and 
produce less costly versions of patent-protect drugs. The government could utilize 
this approach with Evzio’s patented naloxone auto-injector, for example, in 
exchange for reasonable royalties — an approach that was considered for procuring 
ciprofloxacin during the anthrax threat in 2001.88 Third, in response to increases in 
generic drug prices, some observers have proposed allowing importation of 
generics from international manufacturers that have received approval from 
regulators with standards comparable to the FDA’s.89 Fourth, Medicare Part D 
currently is prohibited from negotiating prices of prescription drugs; allowing 
Medicare to do so could help to control dramatic drug price increases. 
 
Consequences for the FDA Unapproved Drugs Initiative 
The UDI represents one example of how a well-meaning FDA regulation can 
have unintended consequences for patient access to affordable medications, with 
several scenarios accounting for why the UDI often resulted in increased drug prices 
and shortages. First, once the FDA takes regulatory action against manufacturers 
marketing unapproved drugs, the few manufacturers already marketing approved 
versions of the drugs, and the ones able to obtain FDA approval, may hold natural 
monopolies or oligopolies until additional manufacturers obtain approval. Obtaining 
approval, however, can be a lengthy process,90 and manufacturers may instead 
choose to discontinue unapproved versions of the drug. Second, when a 
manufacturer of a previously unapproved drug receives approval, it can market its 
drug to physicians and payers as more safe and effective than unapproved versions 
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that remain on the market from other manufacturers, such as in the case of 
phenylephrine eye drops,50 which may eventually result in competitors 
withdrawing from the market. Third, with new approval, manufacturers may file for 
patents or receive market exclusivity, thereby barring generic competition, as was 
the case with colchicine.47 All of these scenarios may lead to fewer competitors, 
wherein prices are more susceptible to increases and shortages may also ensue if 
the remaining manufacturers are unable to meet demand.91 For example, within 
four months of a manufacturer receiving approval for phenylephrine eye drops, the 
other three manufacturers withdrew from the market,50 which was followed soon 
thereafter both by shortages and price increases. 
To incentivize manufacturers’ compliance, the FDA takes action against other 
manufacturers of unapproved versions of the drug.36 The FDA attempts to balance 
this incentive with the potential implications for clinical care. When a manufacturer 
receives approval for a drug, the FDA allows a 1-year grace period before taking 
regulatory action against manufacturers of unapproved versions. The grace period 
can vary based on the expected public health effects of immediate regulatory action 
on patients; whether the effort to obtain approval was publicly disclosed; and the 
difficulty in conducting any clinical studies and obtaining approval of a drug. Despite 
the FDA’s efforts, including extending the regulatory action compliance date by 6 
years to allow manufacturers of pancrelipase to obtain approval,92 we found that 
shortages of pancrelipase still increased. 
 Our findings suggest several ways to mitigate the unintended consequences 
of the FDA’s regulation of unapproved drugs through the UDI. First, the FDA views a 
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short grace period as a way to incentivize manufacturers to be the first to obtain 
approval of a previously unapproved drug, since it may establish a period of de facto 
exclusivity for the first manufacturer.36 However, this strategy may ultimately be 
short-sighted. Instead of allowing short grace periods to incentivize first approval, 
the FDA should establish longer grace periods and also focus on encouraging 
additional manufacturers to obtain approval. Second, as discussed above, the FDA 
should consider prioritizing or waiving user fees for applications for previously 
unapproved drugs. Third, similar to when DESI review was performed, the FDA 
could potentially work with an independent agency to help manufacturers conduct 
literature reviews and bioequivalence studies, making it easier for current 
manufacturers of unapproved drugs to obtain approval and stay in the market. 
Fourth, because these drugs have been marketed for decades, perhaps existing, real-
world evidence could be used to assess their safety and efficacy, in addition to 
determining how they are used in clinical practice. Finally, pharmaceutical 
companies also bear responsibility for the UDI’s unintended consequences. Rather 
than using the UDI as an opportunity to increase prices immediately after obtaining 
approval for decades-old drugs that they were already marketing without approval, 
companies should be held accountable to ensure that they price drugs fairly. 
 
Limitations 
Our study has important limitations that should be considered. In Analysis A 
of the overall characterization of generic competition, first, we based our analyses 
on FDA approval data. Approval does not necessarily indicate that the generic drug 
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was marketed and may thus over-represent the number of generic manufacturers. 
Conversely, once a generic manufacturer receives approval, it may decide to cross-
license with additional drug distributors and wholesalers, thereby increasing the 
number of generic suppliers beyond those that received approval. However, generic 
companies certainly would opt not to compete with themselves, and the licensees 
are likely limited either geographically or by their relationships with individual 
pharmacies. Second, our search did not account for authorized generic drugs, which 
are distributed by the original brand-name manufacturer; however, the effect of 
authorized generic drugs on drug prices is largely limited to the first 180 days after 
the first generic drug’s approval.93,94 Third, we focused our study on only tablet and 
capsule formulations of drugs. Injections and solutions, in particular, are generally 
produced by fewer manufacturers because of more complex manufacturing and 
distribution processes, as evidenced by disproportionate increases in prices and 
shortages.95 Fourth, we focused on bioequivalent approvals of brand-name drugs 
and did not determine whether within-class generics had been approved, which 
may offer reasonable, lower-priced alternatives that can be substituted for brand-
name drugs. Finally, we analyzed only brand-name drugs containing active 
pharmaceutical ingredients that have never before been approved by the FDA, as 
opposed to their potential subsequent reformulations. However, this approach is 
consistent with prior studies of pharmaceutical competition,18,96 in part because 
approvals for reformulated drugs are subject to different lengths of exclusivity. 
 In Analysis B of the unintended consequences of the UDI, first, in our 
calculation of shortage duration, we excluded drugs with shortages beginning and 
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ending on the same day or lasting fewer than 7 days because it is not possible to 
quantify their shortage duration. However, this likely led to our underestimating the 
effect of the UDI on drug shortage duration. It is highly likely that drugs with 
shortages of this length were actually in shortage, as the manufacturer withdrew the 
drug from the market, but we cannot know how long the shortage persisted. 
Nevertheless, our main analysis includes these shortages, as we determined 
whether any drug shortage took place before and after the UDI. 
Second, we presented data on average wholesale prices, which do not 
account for manufacturer rebates to payers or patients. However, data on rebates 
are not readily available from manufacturers. In addition, trends in prices still 
provide valuable information on the effect of the UDI. We also reported unit prices 
for each drug (i.e. per gram, per milliliter, or per piece), because some drugs in our 
sample are consumed daily whereas others are taken as needed. Thus, even a 
change of $0.50 for a drug taken daily amounts to a $15 increase over a month. 
Furthermore, we focused our analysis on the lowest priced version of the drug 
available on the market, without knowing market share, potentially 
underestimating the effect of the UDI on average price paid by patients. 
Third, because the UDI analysis is an observational study, it is possible that 
changes observed may have been influenced by factors besides the UDI, such as 
increased demand for the drugs, other legislation or regulatory decisions, or other 
non-regulatory factors or trends, such as manufacturer product profitability or price 
competition. We were not able to identify an adequate control group of drugs that 
did not face UDI action. However, while shortages have increased overall in the past 
63 
 
decade,97 as we discuss earlier, from 2006 to 2012, the average generic price for 
widely used drugs decreased between 7.2% and 14.5%, while as of 2013, only 20% 
and 10% of generic drugs faced a price increase of at least 15% and 50%, 
respectively.27  
 
Conclusion 
Generic medicines offer a significantly cheaper alternative to brand-name 
drugs and have become an indispensable means of maintaining patient access and 
adherence to treatments. Our study found that since the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, 
80% of brand-name drugs approved by the FDA and eligible for generic competition 
have at least one generic version. However, more than one-third of drug products 
have three or fewer generic manufacturers, making them susceptible to 
monopolistic and oligopolistic conditions that allow pharmaceutical companies to 
raise drug prices, sometimes exorbitantly. This analysis has informed efforts at the 
FDA Office of Generic Drugs to continue to revise their review processes to ensure 
timely approval of affordable generic medications. Though there are multiple 
reasons for decreased generic market competitiveness, this study investigates the 
FDA’s Unapproved Drugs Initiative, a specific regulation that unintentionally led to 
fewer manufacturers, higher drug prices, and more frequent and longer shortages, 
while not necessarily establishing their safety or efficacy based on newly conducted 
clinical trials. Though the UDI is certainly a praiseworthy attempt to ensure that all 
drugs, including those that are marketed without formal FDA approval, are safe and 
effective for patients, careful revision and supplementation of the UDI are needed to 
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ensure that all drugs are not only safe and effective, but also affordable and 
accessible for patients. 
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Appendix 
 
Exhibit A: Currently Marketed Drug Products with No Bioequivalent Generic 
Drugs (as of January 13, 2016) 
Approval 
Date 
Generic Name 
Orphan 
Designation 
Priority 
Review 
24-May-85 AURANOFIN No Yes 
8-Nov-85 TRIENTINE HYDROCHLORIDE Yes Yes 
26-Dec-85 NABILONE No No 
15-Dec-86 CLOFAZIMINE Yes Yes 
11-Aug-88 TIOPRONIN Yes Yes 
31-Jul-90 OLSALAZINE SODIUM No Yes 
26-Dec-90 ALTRETAMINE Yes Yes 
30-Jan-91 SUCCIMER Yes Yes 
20-Dec-95 CEFTIBUTEN DIHYDRATE No No 
11-Jun-96 ALBENDAZOLE Yes Yes 
19-Sep-96 NILUTAMIDE No No 
26-Sep-96 
PENTOSAN POLYSULFATE 
SODIUM 
Yes No 
9-Dec-96 ZILEUTON No No 
14-Mar-97 NELFINAVIR MESYLATE No Yes 
9-May-97 UREA, C-14 No Yes 
76 
 
29-May-97 TOREMIFENE CITRATE Yes No 
11-Sep-97 DOLASETRON MESYLATE No No 
22-Jun-98 RIFAPENTINE Yes Yes 
18-Jan-02 NITISINONE Yes Yes 
31-Jul-03 MIGLUSTAT Yes No 
2-Oct-03 
FERRIC 
HEXACYANOFERRATE(II) 
Yes Yes 
 
 
